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We formulate a private learning model to study an intrinsic tradeoff between privacy and query complexity
in sequential learning. Our model involves a learner who aims to determine a scalar value, v∗, by sequentially
querying an external database and receiving binary responses. In the meantime, an adversary observes the
learner’s queries, though not the responses, and tries to infer from them the value of v∗. The objective of the
learner is to obtain an accurate estimate of v∗ using only a small number of queries, while simultaneously
protecting her privacy by making v∗ provably difficult to learn for the adversary. Our main results provide
tight upper and lower bounds on the learner’s query complexity as a function of desired levels of privacy
and estimation accuracy. We also construct explicit query strategies whose complexity is optimal up to an
additive constant.*
Key words : sequential learning, privacy, bisection algorithm.
1. Introduction
Organizations and individuals often rely on relevant data to solve decision problems. Sometimes,
such data are beyond the immediate reach of a decision maker and must be acquired by interacting
with an external entity or environment. However, these interactions may be monitored by a third-
party adversary and subject the decision maker to potential privacy breaches, a possibility that has
become increasingly prominent as information technologies and tools for data analytics advance.
The present paper studies a decision maker, henceforth referred to as the learner, who acquires
data from an external entity in an interactive fashion by submitting sequential queries. The interac-
tivity benefits the learner by enabling her to tailor future queries based on past responses and thus
reduce the number of queries needed, while, at the same time, exposes the learner to substantial
privacy risk: the more her queries depend on past responses, the easier it might be for an adversary
to use the observed queries to infer those past responses. Our main objective is to articulate and
* An extended abstract of this paper is accepted for presentation at Conference on Learning Theory (COLT) 2018.
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understand an intrinsic privacy versus query complexity tradeoff in the context of such a Private
Sequential Learning model.
We begin with an informal description of the model. A learner would like to determine the value
of a scalar, v∗, referred to as the true value, which lies in a bounded subset of R. To search for
v∗, she must interact with an external database, through sequentially submitted queries: at step k,
the learner submits a query, qk ∈R, and receives a binary response, rk, where rk = 1 if v∗ ≥ qk, and
rk = 0, otherwise. The interaction is sequential in the sense that the learner may choose a query
depending on the responses to all previous queries. Meanwhile, there is an adversary who eavesdrops
on the learner’s actions: she observes all of the learner’s queries, qk, but not the responses, and
tries to use these queries to estimate the true value, v∗. The learner’s goal is to submit queries in
such a way that she can learn v∗ within a prescribed error tolerance, while v∗ cannot be accurately
estimated by the adversary with high confidence. The learner’s goal is easily attained by submitting
an unlimited number of queries, in which case the queries need not depend on the past responses
and hence reveal no information to the adversary. Our quest is, however, to understand the least
number of queries that the learner needs to submit in order for her to successfully retain privacy.
Is the query complexity significantly different from the case where privacy constraints are absent?
How does it vary as a function of the levels of accuracy and privacy? Is there a simple and yet
efficient query strategy that the learner can adopt? Our main results address these questions.
1.1. Motivating Examples
We discuss two examples that provide some context for our model.
Example 1 - learning an optimal price. A firm is to release a new product and would like to
identify a revenue maximizing price, p∗, prior to the product launch. The firm believes that the
revenue function, f(p), is strictly concave and differentiable as a function of the price, p, but has
otherwise little additional information. A sequential learning process is employed to identify p∗
over a series of epochs: in epoch k, the firm assesses how the market responds to a test price,
pk, and receives a binary feedback as to whether f
′(pk)≥ 0 or f ′(pk)< 0. This may be achieved,
for instance, by contracting a consulting firm to conduct market surveys on the price sensitivity
around pk. The firm would like to estimate p
∗ with reasonable accuracy over a small number of
epochs, but is wary that a competitor might be able to observe the surveys and deduce from them
the value of p∗ ahead of the product launch. In the context of Private Sequential Learning, the
firm is the learner, the competitor is the adversary, the revenue-maximizing price is the true value,
and the test prices are the queries. The binary response on the revenue’s price sensitivity indicates
whether the revenue-maximizing price is less than the current test price.
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Example 2 - online optimization with private weights. In the previous example, the adversary
is a third-party that does not observe the responses to the queries. We now provide a different
example in which the adversary is the database to which queries are submitted, and thus has
partial knowledge of the responses.
Consider a learner who wishes to identify the maximizer, x∗, of a function f(x) =
∑m
i=1αifi(x)
over some bounded interval X ⊂R, where {fi(·)}1≤i≤m is a collection of strictly concave differen-
tiable constituent functions, and {αi}1≤i≤m are positive (private) weights representing the impor-
tance that the learner associates with each constituent function. The learner knows the weights but
does not have information about the constituent functions; such knowledge is to be acquired by
querying an external database. During epoch k, the learner submits a test value, xk, and receives
from the database the derivatives of all constituent functions at xk, {f ′i(xk)}1≤i≤m. Using the
weights, the learner can then compute the derivative f ′(xk), whose sign serves as a binary indi-
cator of the position of the maximizer x∗ relative to the current test value. The database, which
possesses complete information about the constituent functions but does not know the weights,
would like to infer from the learner’s querying pattern the maximizing value x∗ or possibly the
weights themselves. The query strategies that we develop for Private Sequential Learning can also
be applied to this setting. The connection between the two is made precise in Xu (2017).
1.2. Preview of the Main Result
We now preview our main result. Let us begin by introducing some additional notation. Recall
that both the learner and the adversary aim to obtain estimates that are close to a true value v∗.
We denote by  and δ the absolute estimation error that the learner and the adversary is willing
to tolerate, respectively. We will employ a privacy parameter L∈N to quantify the learner’s level
of privacy at the end of the learning process: the learner’s privacy level is L if the adversary can
successfully approximate the true value within an error of δ with probability at most 1/L. A private
query strategy for the learner must be able to produce an estimate of the true value within an
error of at most , while simultaneously guaranteeing that the desired privacy level L holds against
the adversary.
Our main objective is to quantify the query complexity of private sequential learning, N∗(, δ,L),
defined as the minimum number of queries needed for a private learner strategy, under a given set
of parameters, , δ and L. Specifically, we will focus on the regime where 2 < δ≤ 1/L. The reason
for this choice will become clear after a formal introduction of the model, and we will revisit it at
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the beginning of Section 4.1 In this regime, we have the following upper and lower bounds on the
query complexity.
1. We establish an upper bound2 of log(1/L) + 2L by explicitly constructing a private learner
strategy, which applies for any δ in the range (2,1/L].
2. We establish a lower bound of log(δ/) + 2L− 4 by characterizing the amount of information
available to the adversary.
We note that our bounds are tight in the sense that when the adversary’s accuracy requirement
is as loose as possible, i.e., δ = 1/L, the upper bound matches the lower bound, up to an additive
constant.
1.3. Related Work
In the absence of a privacy constraint, the problem of identifying a value within a compact interval
through (possibly noisy) binary feedback is a classical problem arising in domains such as coding
theory (Horstein (1963)) and root finding (Waeber et al. (2013)). It is well known that the bisection
algorithm achieves the optimal query complexity of log(1/) (cf. Waeber et al. (2013)), where  > 0
is the error tolerance. In contrast, to the best of our knowledge, the question of how to preserve a
learner’s privacy when her actions are fully observed by an adversary and what the resulting query
complexity would be has received relatively little attention in the literature.
Related to our work, in spirit, is the body of literature on differential privacy (Dwork et al.
(2006), Dwork and Roth (2014)), a concept that has been applied in statistics (Wasserman and
Zhou (2010), Smith (2011), Duchi et al. (2016)) and learning theory (Raskhodnikova et al. (2008),
Chaudhuri and Hsu (2011), Blum et al. (2013), Feldman and Xiao (2014)). Differential privacy
mandates that the output distribution of an algorithm be insensitive under certain perturbations of
the input data. For instance, Jain et al. (2012) study regret minimization in an online optimization
problem while ensuring differential privacy, in the sense that the distribution of the sequence of
solutions remains nearly identical when any one of the functions being optimized is perturbed. In
contrast, our definition of privacy measures the adversary’s ability to perform a specific inference
task.
In a different model, Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018) study the issue of privacy in a sequential decision
problem, where an agent attempts to reach a particular node in a graph, traversing it in a way that
1 Intuitively, this regime is interesting because of two factors. On the one hand, a smaller δ (relative to the learner’s
accuracy ) is effectively impossible for the adversary, as the adversary has less information available than the learner.
On the other hand, a larger δ (relative to 1/L) makes the adversary’s problem trivial because a random guess in [0,1]
will then have roughly at least 1/L probability to be within 1/L of the true value.
2 All logarithms are taken with respect to base 2. To reduce clutter, non-integer numbers are to be understood as
rounded upwards. For example, the lower bound should be understood as dlog(1/L)e+ 2L, where d·e represents the
ceiling function.
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obfuscates her intended destination against an adversary who observes her past trajectory. The
authors show that the probability of a correct prediction by the adversary is inversely proportional
to the time it takes for the agent to reach her destination. Similar to the setting of Tsitsiklis and
Xu (2018), the learner in our model also plays against a powerful adversary who observes all past
actions. However, a major new element is that the learner in our model strives to learn a piece of
information of which she herself has no prior knowledge, in contrast to the agent in Tsitsiklis and
Xu (2018) who tries to conceal private information already in her possession. In a way, the central
conflict of trying to learn something while preventing others from learning the same information
sets our work apart from the extant literature.
Similarly, our model is close in spirit to private information retrieval problems in the field of
cryptography (Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky (1997), Chor et al. (1998), Gasarch (2004)). In these
problems, a learner wishes to retrieve an item from some location i in a database, in such a manner
that the database obtains no information on the value of i, where the latter requirement can be
either information theoretic or based on computational hardness assumptions. Compared to this
line of literature, our privacy requirement is substantially weaker: the adversary may still obtain
some information on the true value. This relaxation of the privacy requirement allows the learner
to deploy richer and more sample-efficient query strategies.
1.4. Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We formally introduce the Private Sequential
Learning model in Section 2. In Section 3, we motivate and discuss private learner strategies.
Our main results are stated in Section 4. Before delving into the proofs, we examine in Section 5
three examples of learner strategies that provide further insight into the structure of the problem.
Sections 6 and 7 are devoted to the proof of the upper and lower bounds in our main theorem,
respectively. We conclude in Section 8, where we also describe some interesting variations of our
model.
2. The Private Sequential Learning Model
We formally introduce our Private Sequential Learning model. The model involves a learner who
aims to determine a particular true value, v∗. The true value is a scalar in some bounded subset of
R. Without loss of generality, we assume that v∗ belongs to the interval3 [0,1) and that the learner
knows that this is the case. The true value is stored in an external database. In order to learn the
true value, the learner interacts with the database by submitting queries as follows. At each step
3 We consider a half-open interval here, which allows for a cleaner presentation, but the essence is not changed if the
interval is closed.
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k, the learner submits a query qk ∈ [0,1), and receives from the database a response, rk, indicating
whether v∗ is greater than or equal to the query value, i.e.,
rk = I(v∗ ≥ qk),
where I(·) stands for the indicator function. Furthermore, each query is allowed to depend on the
responses to previous queries, through a learner strategy, to be defined shortly.
Denote by N the total number of learner queries, and by  > 0 the learner’s desired accuracy.
After receiving the responses to N queries, the learner aims to produce an estimate xˆ, for v∗, that
satisfies
|xˆ− v∗| ≤ 
2
.
In the meantime, there is an adversary who is also interested in learning the true value, v∗.
The adversary has no access to the database, and hence seeks to estimate v∗ by free-riding on
observations of the learner queries. Let δ > 0 be an accuracy parameter for the adversary. We
assume that the adversary can observe the values of the queries but not the responses, and knows
the learner’s query strategy. Based on this information, and after observing all of the queries
submitted by the learner, the adversary aims to generate an estimate, xˆa, for v∗, that satisfies
|xˆa− v∗| ≤ δ
2
.
2.1. Learner Strategy
The queries that the learner submits to the database are generated by a (possibly randomized)
learner strategy, in a sequential manner: the query at step k depends on the queries and their
responses up until step k−1, as well as on a discrete random variable Y . In particular, the random
variable Y allows the learner to randomize if needed, and we will refer to Y as the random seed.
Without loss of generality, we assume that Y is uniformly distributed over {1,2, . . . ,Y}, where Y is
a large integer. Formally, fixing N ∈N, a learner strategy φ of length N is comprised of two parts:
1. A finite sequence of N query functions, (φ1, . . . , φN), where each φk is a mapping that takes
as input the values of the first k− 1 queries submitted, the corresponding responses, as well
as the realized value of Y , and outputs the kth query qk.
2. An estimation function φE, which takes as input the N queries submitted, the corresponding
responses, and the realized value of Y , and outputs the final estimate xˆ for the true value v∗.
More precisely, we have
1. If k= 1, then φ1 : {1,2, . . . ,Y}→ [0,1), and q1 = φ1(Y );
If k= 2,3, . . . ,N , then φk : [0,1)
k−1×{0,1}k−1×{1,2, . . . ,Y}→ [0,1), and
qk = φk(q1, q2, . . . , qk−1, r1, r2, . . . , rk−1, Y );
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2. φE : [0,1)N ×{0,1}N ×{1,2, . . . ,Y}→ [0,1), and xˆ= φE(q1, q2, . . . , qN , r1, r2, . . . , rN , Y ).
Observe that the above definition can be simplified: knowing the value of the random seed Y and the
responses to the queries is sufficient for reconstructing the values of the queries. As an example, we
have q2 = φ2(q1, r1, Y ) = φ2(φ1(Y ), r1, Y ) = φ
′
2(r1, Y ), for some new function φ
′
2. Through induction,
it then suffices to let the input to φk be just r1, . . . , rk−1 and Y . This leads to an alternative, simpler
definition of learner strategies:
1. If k= 1, then φ1 : {1,2, . . . ,Y}→ [0,1), and q1 = φ1(Y );
If k= 2,3, . . . ,N , then φk : {0,1}k−1×{1,2, . . . ,Y}→ [0,1), and qk = φk(r1, r2, . . . , rk−1, Y );
2. φE : {0,1}N ×{1,2, . . . ,Y}→ [0,1), and xˆ= φE(r1, r2, . . . , rN , Y ).
In the sequel, we adopt the latter, simpler definition. In addition, we will consider learner strate-
gies that submit distinct queries, as repeated queries do not provide additional information to the
learner. We will denote by ΦN the set of all learner strategies of length N , defined as above.
Fix a learner strategy φ ∈ ΦN . To clarify the dependence on the random seed, for any x ∈
[0,1) and y ∈ {1,2, . . . ,Y}, we will use q(x, y) to denote the realization of the sequence of queries,
(q1, q2, . . . , qN), when the true value v
∗ is x and the learner’s random seed Y is y. Similarly, we will
denote by xˆ(x, y) the learner’s estimate of the true value when v∗ = x and Y = y.
2.2. Information Available to the Adversary
We summarize in this subsection the information available to the adversary. First, the adversary is
aware that the true value v∗ belongs to [0,1). Second, we assume that the adversary can observe the
values of the queries but not the corresponding responses, and that the learner strategy φ is known
to the adversary. In particular, the adversary observes the value of each query qk, for k= 1, . . . ,N ,
and knows the N mappings, φ1, φ2, . . . , φN . This means that if the adversary had access to the
values r1, r2, . . . , rk−1 and the realized value of Y , she would know exactly what qk is for step k.
While it may seem that an adversary who sees both the learner strategy and her actions is too
powerful to defend against, we will see in the sequel that the learner will still be able to implement
effective and efficient obfuscation by exploiting the randomness of Y .
3. Private Learner Strategies
In this section, we introduce and formally define private learning strategies, the central concept of
this paper. While we will briefly discuss the underlying intuition, a more detailed interpretation is
relegated to Appendix A. As was mentioned in the Introduction, a private learner strategy must
always make sure that its estimate is close to the true value v∗, while keeping the adversary’s
probability of correct detection of v∗ sufficiently small. Our goal in this section is to formalize those
ideas. To this end, we first introduce in Section 3.1 ways of quantifying the amount of information
acquired by the adversary, as a function of the learner’s queries. This then leads to a precise privacy
constraint presented in Section 3.2.
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3.1. Information Set
Recall from Section 2.2 that the adversary knows the values of the queries and the learner strategy.
We will now convert this knowledge into a succinct representation: the information set of the
adversary. Fix a learner strategy, φ. Denote by Q(x) the set of query sequences that have a positive
probability of appearing under φ, when the true value v∗ is equal to x:
Q(x) = {q ∈ [0,1)N : Pφ(Q= q)> 0}, (1)
where Q is a vector-valued random variable representing the sequence of learner queries, whereas
q stands for a typical realization; the probability is measured with respect to the randomness in
the learner’s random seed, Y .
Definition 3.1 Fix φ∈ΦN . The information set for the adversary, I(q), is defined by:
I(q) =
{
x∈ [0,1) : q ∈Q(x)
}
, q ∈ [0,1)N . (2)
From the viewpoint of the adversary, the information set represents all possible true values that
are consistent with the queries observed. As such, it captures the amount of information that the
learner reveals to the adversary.
3.2. (, δ,L)−Private Strategies
A private learner strategy should achieve two aims: accuracy and privacy. Accuracy can be captured
in a relatively straightforward manner, by measuring the absolute distance between the learner’s
estimate and the true value. An effective measure of the learner’s privacy, on the other hand, is
more subtle, as it depends on what the adversary is able to infer. To this end, we develop in this
subsection a privacy metric by quantifying the “effective size” of the information set I(q) described
in Definition 3.1. Intuitively, since the information set contains all possible realizations of the true
value, v∗, the larger the information set, the more difficult it is for the adversary to pin down the
true value.
The choice of such a metric requires care. As a first attempt, the diameter of the information set,
supy1,y2∈I(q) |y1− y2|, may appear to be a natural candidate. Since the adversary has an accuracy
parameter of δ, we could require that the diameter of I(q) be greater than δ. The diameter, however,
is not a good metric, as it paints an overly optimistic picture for the learner. Consider the example
where the information set is the union of two intervals of length δ each, placed far apart from
each other. By setting her estimate to be the center of one of the two intervals, chosen at random
with equal probabilities, the adversary will have probability 1/2 of correctly predicting the true
value, even though the diameter of the information set could be large. The Lebesgue measure of
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the information set appears to be another plausible candidate. However, it also fails to accurately
describe the learner’s privacy. Consider again the example where the information set consists of
many distantly placed but very small intervals. It is not difficult to see that the adversary would
not be able to correctly estimate the true value with high certainty, even if the Lebesgue measure
of the set is arbitrarily small.
The shortcomings of the above metrics motivate a more refined notion of “effective size,” and in
particular, one that would be appropriate for disconnected information sets. To this end, we will
use set coverability to measure the size of the information set, defined as follows.
Definition 3.2 Fix δ > 0, L ∈N, and a set E ⊂R. We say that a collection of L closed intervals
[a1, b1], [a2, b2], . . . , [aL, bL], is a (δ,L) cover for E if E ⊂
⋃
1≤j≤L[aj, bj], and bj − aj ≤ δ for all j.
We say that a set E is (δ,L)-coverable if it admits a (δ,L) cover. In addition, we define the
δ-cover number of a set E, Cδ(E), as
Cδ(E),min {L∈N : E is (δ,L)-coverable}. (3)
We are now ready to define (, δ,L)-private learner strategies.
Definition 3.3 (Private Learner Strategy) Fix  > 0, δ > 0, L ≥ 2, with L ∈ N. A learner
strategy φ∈ΦN is (, δ,L)-private if it satisfies the following:
1. Accuracy constraint: the learner estimate accurately recovers the true value, with probability
one:
P
(∣∣xˆ(x,Y )−x∣∣≤ /2)= 1, ∀x∈ [0,1),
where the probability is measured with respect to the randomness in Y .
2. Privacy constraint: for every x ∈ [0,1) and every possible sequence of queries q ∈ Q(x), the
δ-cover number of the information set for the adversary, Cδ
(I(q)), is at least L, i.e.,
Cδ
(I(q))≥L, ∀ q ∈Q(x). (4)
The accuracy constraint requires that a private learner strategy always produce an accurate
estimate within the error tolerance , for any possible true value in [0,1). The privacy constraint
controls the size of the information set induced by the sequence of queries generated, and the
parameter L can be interpreted as the learner’s privacy level: since the intervals used to cover
the information set are of length at most δ, each interval can be thought of as representing a
plausible guess for the adversary. Therefore, the probability of the adversary successfully estimating
the location of v∗ is essentially inversely proportional to the number of intervals needed to cover
the information set, which is at most 1/L. We make the link between 1/L and the adversary’s
probability of correct estimation precise in Appendix A.
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4. Main Result
The learner’s overall objective is to employ the minimum number of queries while satisfying the
accuracy and privacy requirements. We state our main theorem in this section, which establishes
lower and upper bounds for the query complexity of a private learner strategy, as a function of the
adversary accuracy δ, learner accuracy , and learner privacy level, L. Recall that ΦN is the set
of learner strategies of length N . Define N∗(, δ,L) to be the minimum number of queries needed
across all (, δ,L)-private learner strategies,
N∗(, δ,L) = min
{
N ∈N : ΦN contains at least one (, δ,L)-private strategy
}
. (5)
Our result will focus on the regime of parameters where
0< 2 < δ≤ 1/L. (6)
Having 2 < δ corresponds to a scenario where the learner would like to identify the true value with
high accuracy, while the adversary is aiming for a coarse estimate. Note that the regime where
δ <  is arguably much less interesting, because it is not natural to expect the adversary, who is
not engaged in the querying process, to have a higher accuracy requirement than the learner. The
requirement that δ ≤ 1/L stems from the following argument. If δ ≥ 1/(L − 1), then the entire
interval [0,1) is trivially (δ,L − 1)-coverable, and Cδ
(I(q)) ≤ Cδ([0,1)) ≤ L − 1 < L. Thus, the
privacy constraint is automatically violated, and no private learner strategy exists. To obtain a
nontrivial problem, we therefore only need to consider the case where δ < 1/(L− 1), which is only
sightly broader than the regime δ ≤ 1/L that we consider. The following theorem is the main
result of this paper.
Theorem 4.1 (Query Complexity of Private Sequential Learning) Fix  > 0, δ > 0, and a
positive integer L≥ 2, such that 2 < δ≤ 1/L. Then,
max
{
log
1

, log
δ

+ 2L− 4
}
≤N∗(, δ,L)≤ log 1
L
+ 2L. (7)
The proof of the upper bound in Theorem 4.1 is constructive, providing a specific learner strat-
egy that satisfies the bound. If we set δ = 1/L, which corresponds to the worst case where the
adversary’s accuracy requirement is essentially as loose as possible, then Theorem 4.1 leads to the
following corollary. It yields upper and lower bounds that are tight up to an additive constant of
4. In other words, the private learner strategy that we construct achieves essentially the optimal
query-complexity in this scenario.
Corollary 4.2 Fix  > 0 and a positive integer L≥ 2 such that 2 < 1/L. The following holds.
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1. If L= 2, we have
log
1

≤N∗
(
,
1
L
,L
)
≤ log 1

+ 4. (8)
2. If L≥ 3, we have
log
1
L
+ 2L− 4≤N∗
(
,
1
L
,L
)
≤ log 1
L
+ 2L. (9)
A main take-away from the above results is about the price of privacy: it is not difficult to see
that in the absence of a privacy constraint, the most efficient strategy, using a bisection search, can
locate the true value with log(1/) queries. Our results thus demonstrate that the price of privacy
is at most an additive factor of 2L.
5. Examples of Learner Strategies
Before delving into the proofs of our main result, we first provide some intuition and motiva-
tion by examining three representative learner strategies situated at different locations along the
complexity-privacy tradeoff curve.
Strategy 1: Bisection. A most natural candidate is the classical bisection strategy, which is
known to achieve the optimal query-complexity in the absence of privacy constraints. Under this
strategy, the learner first submits a query at the mid-point of [0,1), i.e., q1 = 0.5. Then, based on
the response, the learner identifies the half interval that contains the true value, and subsequently
submits its mid-point as the next query, q2. The process continues recursively until the learner finds
an interval of length at most  that contains the true value v∗. Figure 1 provides an illustration of
this strategy.
0 !" !#≤ % 1!'!(
Figure 1 An example of the bisection search where the red star represents the true value v∗. The dashed line with
arrows represents the learner’s error tolerance, and the solid line with arrows represents the information
set for the adversary, I(q).
Under the Bisection strategy, the learner knows that the interval containing the true value
is halved with each successive query. It follows that the number of queries needed under the
bisection strategy is N = log(1/). Unfortunately, the favorable query complexity afforded by the
bisection strategy comes at the cost of the learner’s privacy. In particular, at the end of the process,
the adversary knows that the true value must be close to the last query the learner submitted,
and hence the δ-cover number of the information set is always 1 whenever δ > 2. As such, the
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Bisection strategy lies at one extreme end of the complexity-privacy tradeoff, with a minimal query
complexity but no privacy.
Strategy 2: -Dense. Sitting on the opposite end of the spectrum is the -Dense strategy, where
the learner submits a sequence of N = 1/−1 pre-determined queries, with q1 = , q2 = 2, . . . , qN =
N (Figure 2). The strategy is accurate because the distance between two adjacent queries is equal
to the error tolerance, . Moreover, because the sequence of queries is pre-determined and does not
depend on the location of the true value, the adversary obtains no information from the learner’s
query patterns, and the information set remains the interval [0,1) throughout. Thus, if δ ≤ 1/L,
the strategy is (, δ,L)-private. Compared to the Bisection strategy, the perfect privacy of -Dense
Strategy is achieved at the expense of an exponential increase in query complexity, from log(1/)
to 1/. The -Dense strategy is therefore overly conservative and, as our proposed strategy will
demonstrate, leads to unnecessarily high query complexity for moderate values of L.
0 !* 1!'!" !#≤ % !(!+ !, ≤ %
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Figure 2 An example of the -Dense strategy. The dashed line with arrows represents the learner’s error tolerance,
and the solid line with arrows represents the information set for the adversary, I(q).
Strategy 3: Replicated Bisection. The contrast between Strategies 1 and 2 highlights the
tension between the learner’s conflicting objectives: on the one hand, to maximally exploit the
information learned from earlier queries and shorten the search, and on the other hand, to reduce
adaptivity so that the queries are not too revealing. An efficient private learner strategy should
therefore strike a balance between these two objectives. To start, it is natural to consider a learner
strategy that combines Strategies 1 and 2 in an appropriate manner, which leads us to the Repli-
cated Bisection strategy. This strategy has two phases:
1. Phase 1 - Deterministic Queries. The learner submits L−1 queries, chosen deterministically:
q1 =
1
L
, q2 =
2
L
, . . . , qL−1 =
L− 1
L
, (10)
which partition the unit interval into L disjoint sub-intervals of length 1/L each:
[0,1/L), [1/L,2/L), . . . , [1− 1/L,1). At this point, the learner has learned which one of the L
sub-intervals contains the true value, while the adversary has gained no additional information
about the true value. We will refer to the sub-interval that contains the true value as the true
sub-interval, and all other sub-intervals as false sub-intervals. This phase uses L− 1 queries.
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2. Phase 2 - Replicated Bisection. In the second phase, the learner conducts a bisection strategy
within the true sub-interval until the true value has been located, while in the meantime
submitting translated replicas of these queries in each false sub-interval, in parallel. The
exact order in which these queries are submitted can be arranged in such a manner as to be
independent from the identity of the true sub-interval. This phase uses L log(1/L) queries,
where log(1/L) is the number of queries needed to conduct a bisection strategy in a sub-
interval.
When the process is completed, the learner will have identified the true value via the bisection
strategy within the true sub-interval, while the adversary will have seen L identical copies of
the same bisection strategy, leading to an information set that consists of L disjoint length-2
intervals, separated from each other by a distance of 1/L− 2. It is not difficult to show that the
Replicated Bisection strategy is (, δ,L)-private, with L log(1/L)+L−1 queries. In particular, the
Replicated Bisection strategy achieves privacy at the cost of an increase in query complexity that
is a multiplicative factor of L, compared to that of the Bisection strategy (N = log(1/)).
0 !* 1!'!" !#≤ % !(!+ !, ≤ %
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Figure 3 An example of the Replicated Bisection strategy, with L= 2. The dashed lines with arrows represents
the learner’s error tolerance, and the solid lines with arrows represents the information set for the
adversary, I(q).
The Replicated Bisection strategy thus appears to be a natural and successful combination of
the Bisection and -Dense strategies: it ensures privacy while requiring substantially fewer than
the N = 1/ queries of the -Dense strategy. Is it an optimal strategy, achieving the minimal query
complexity for a given privacy level, L? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is negative. Our proof for
the upper bound of Theorem 4.1 in the following section will show that the query complexity of
the Replicated Bisection strategy can be much improved, so that the query complexity overhead,
compared to the Bisection strategy, is only an additive factor of L.
6. Proof of the Upper Bound: Opportunistic Bisection Strategy
We prove in this section the upper bound on the query complexity in Theorem 4.1. This is achieved
by constructing a specific learner strategy, which we will refer to as the Opportunistic Bisection
(OB) strategy. We start with some terminology, to facilitate the exposition.
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Definition 6.1 Fix M ∈N and an interval J ⊂ [0,1). Let Z = (Z1,Z2, . . .) be an infinite sequence
of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables, with P(Zi = 0) = 1/2. Let (q1, q2, . . . , qM) be a sequence of M
queries, where q1 is equal to the mid-point of J , and let (r1, r2, . . . , rM) be their corresponding
responses.
1. We say that (q1, q2, . . . , qM) is a truthful bisection search of J , if it satisfies the following
criteria, defined inductively. Let J1 =J . For i= 1,2, . . . ,M ,
(a) qi is set to
qi = mid-point of interval Ji. (11)
(b) Ji+1 is set to
Ji+1 =
{
[inf Ji , qi) , if ri = 0,
[qi , supJi) , if ri = 1. (12)
2. We say that (q1, q2, . . . , qM) is a fictitious bisection search of J , if it satisfies the following
criteria, defined inductively. Let J1 =J . For i= 1,2, . . . ,M ,
(a) qi is set to
qi = mid-point of interval Ji. (13)
(b) Ji+1 is set to
Ji+1 =
{
[inf Ji , qi) , if Zi = 0,
[qi , supJi) , if Zi = 1. (14)
In words, whether a bisection search is truthful or fictitious depends on how the interval Ji is
updated. In a truthful search, Ji+1 is set to the half-interval within Ji that, according to the
response ri, contains the true value. In a fictitious search, this choice is made uniformly at random,
according to Z.
We are now ready to define the Opportunistic Bisection strategy, which consists of two phases.
Phase 1 - Opportunistic Guesses. The first 2L queries submitted by the strategy are deterministic
and do not depend on responses from earlier queries, with
qi = (i− 1) 1
L
, i= 1, . . . ,L, (15)
and
(qL+1, qL+2, . . . , q2L) = (q1 + , q2 + , . . . , qL + ). (16)
Notice that the two queries qi and qi+L determine an interval [qi, qi+L) of length . At the end of
this phase, there will be L such intervals, evenly spaced across the unit interval. Each such interval
[qi, qi+L) thus represents a “guess” on the true value, v
∗; if v∗ lies in [qi, qi+L) for some i∈ {1, . . . ,L},
then the learner learns the location of v∗ within the desired level of accuracy. We will refer to the
interval [qi, qi+L) as the ith guess.
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Phase 2 - Local Bisection Search. The guesses submitted in Phase 1 are few and spaced apart,
and it is possible that none of the L guesses contains v∗. The goal of Phase 2 is to hence ensure that
the learner identifies v∗ at the end, but the queries are to be executed in a fashion that conceals
from the adversary whether v∗ was identified during Phase 1 or Phase 2.
Define J (i) as the interval between the ith and (i+ 1)th guesses:
J (i) = [qL+i, qi+1) =
[
(i− 1) 1
L
+ ,
i
L
)
, i= 1,2, . . . ,L. (17)
We will refer to J (i) as the ith sub-interval. Importantly, by the end of Phase 1, if none of the
guesses contains the true value, then the learner knows which sub-interval contains the true value,
which we will denote by J ∗. The queries in Phase 2 will be chosen according to the following rule:
1. If none of the guesses in Phase 1 contains v∗, then, let (q2L+1, q2L+2, . . . , q2L+M) be a truthful
bisection search of J ∗ with M = log ( 1
L
)
.
2. If one of the guesses in Phase 1 contains v∗, then, let J˜ be a sub-interval chosen uniformly at
random among all L sub-intervals, and let (q2L+1, q2L+2, . . . , q2L+M) be a fictitious bisection
search of J˜ with M = log ( 1
L
)
, using the randomization provided by Y (i.e., using Y to
generate the sequence of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables, Zi).
An example of this strategy is provided in Figure 4.
Remark. It is interesting to contrast Opportunistic Bisection with the Replicated Bisection
strategy in Section 5. Both strategies use deterministic queries in the first phase, but instead of
submitting L queries, the OB strategy incurs a slight overhead and submits L guesses. Crucially,
the guesses make it possible to immediately discover the location of the true value in the first
phase, albeit such discoveries might be unlikely. In the second stage, while the Replicated Bisection
strategy conducts a bisection search in each of the L sub-intervals, the Opportunistic Bisection
strategy does so in only one of the sub-intervals, hence drastically reducing the number of queries.
It follows directly from the definition that the number of queries submitted under the Oppor-
tunistic Bisection strategy is:
N = 2L+ log
(
1
L
)
. (18)
0 1!" !'!( !* !+%
sub-interval
!,!> !?
guess
≤ %
% %!#
Figure 4 An example of the Opportunistic Bisection Strategy, with L= 3.
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To complete the proof of the upper bound in Theorem 4.1, it thus suffices to show that the OB
strategy satisfies both the accuracy and privacy constraints. This is accomplished in the following
proposition, which is the main result of this section.
Proposition 6.2 Fix  > 0, δ > 0, and a positive integer L≥ 2, such that 2 < δ≤ 1/L. Then, the
Opportunistic Bisection (OB) strategy is (, δ,L)-private.
Proof. We first show that the OB strategy is accurate, and specifically, that it will allow the
learner to produce an estimate of v∗ with an absolute error of at most /2. To this end, we consider
two possible scenarios:
Case 1. Suppose that some guess in Phase 1, namely, the interval [qi′ , qi′+L), contains the true
value, v∗. In this case, the learner can set xˆ to be the mid-point of the guess, i.e., xˆ= (qi′+qi′+L)/2.
Since the length of each guess is exactly , we must have |xˆ− v∗| ≤ /2.
Case 2. Suppose that none of the guesses in Phase 1 contains v∗. This means that a truthful
bisection search will be conducted in Phase 2, in the sub-interval that contains v∗. Because the
search is truthful, we know that one of the two intervals adjacent to qN must contain v
∗. Let this
interval be denoted by H∗. Furthermore, because the length of each sub-interval is less than 1/L
and there are log(1/L) steps in the bisection search, we know that the length of H∗ is at most .
Therefore, the learner can generate an accurate estimate by setting xˆ to be the mid-point of H∗.
Together with Case 1, this shows that the OB strategy leads to an accurate estimate of v∗.
We now show that the OB strategy is private, and in particular, that the δ-cover number of the
information set of the adversary, Cδ
(I(q)), is at least L. Denote by G the union of the guesses, i.e.,
G =
L⋃
i=1
[qi, qi+L). (19)
It is elementary to show that for two sets U and V , with U ⊂ V , if Cδ(U) is at least L, then so
is Cδ(V ). Therefore, it suffices to prove the following two claims.
Claim 6.3 The δ-cover number of G, Cδ(G), is at least L.
Claim 6.4 The information set, I(q), contains G.
We first show Claim 6.3. Consider any interval J ⊂ [0,1), with length δ, used in a cover for G.
Note that by construction, each guess has length , and two adjacent guesses are separated by a
distance of 1/L− . Since δ ≤ 1/L, this implies that the Lebesgue measure of J ∩ G is at most .
Since the Lebesgue measure of G is L, we conclude that it will require at least L such intervals J
of size δ to cover G. Therefore, Cδ(G)≥L. This proves Claim 6.3.
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We next show Claim 6.4. To see that is the case, note that any particular query sequence q
can arise in two different ways: (i) it may be that v∗ is an arbitrary element of one of the guesses
(i.e., v∗ ∈ G), and q is the result of a fictitious bisection search; or, (ii) it may be that v∗ lies
outside the guesses, and q is the result of a truthful bisection search. The adversary has no way of
distinguishing between these two possibilities. Furthermore, there is no information available to the
adversary that could distinguish between different elements of G. As a consequence, all elements
of G are included within the information set, i.e., G ⊂ I(q), which establishes Claim 6.4. Q.E.D.
7. Proof of the Lower Bound
We now derive the two lower bounds on query complexity in Theorem 4.1. Note that the query-
complexity of the Opportunistic Bisection strategy carries a 2L overhead compared to the (non-
private) bisection strategy. The value 2L admits an intuitive justification: a private learner strategy
must create L plausible locations of the true values, and each such location is associated with at
least 2 queries. One may question, however, whether the 2L queries need to be distinct from the
log(1/) queries already used by the bisection search, or whether the query complexity could be
further reduced by “blending” the queries for obfuscation with those for identifying the true value
in a more effective manner. The key to the proof of the lower bound in this section is to show
that such “blending” is not possible: in order to successfully obfuscate the true value, one needs
2L queries that are distinct from those that participate in the bisection algorithm.
7.1. Information Sets
We first introduce some notation to facilitate our discussion. Recall that (q1, q2, . . . , qN) is the
sequence of learner queries. For the remainder of this section, we augment this sequence with two
more queries, q0, 0 and qN+1, 1, so that q = (0, q1, q2, . . . , qN ,1). This is inconsequential because
0 ≤ v∗ < 1, and hence adding q0 and qN+1 does not provide additional information to either the
learner or the adversary.
We start by examining the information provided to the learner, through the queries and the
responses. Let us fix an arbitrary y ∈ {1, . . . ,Y} that has positive probability, and some v∗ ∈ [0,1).
Consider the resulting sequence of queries, q = q(v∗, y), and then let qS = (q0, q1, . . . , qN , qN+1) be
the sequence of queries in q, arranged in increasing order. (In particular, q0 = 0 and qN+1 = 1.)
For each query qi, the learner knows (through the response to the corresponding query) whether
v∗ < qi or v∗ ≥ qi. In particular, at the end of the learning process, the learner has access to an
interval of the form H = [qi, qi+1), for some i ∈ {0,1, . . . ,N}, such that v∗ is certain to belong
to that interval. Furthermore, from the definition of user strategies, all elements of that interval
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would have produced identical responses to the queries, and the learner has no information that
distinguishes between such elements.
It is not hard to see that if qi+1 − qi > , then the learner has no way of producing an (/2)-
accurate estimate of v∗.4 Since we are interested in learner strategies that satisfy the accuracy
constraint in Definition 3.3, we conclude that the length of H is at most .
Let us now consider the situation from the point of view of the adversary. The adversary can
look at the query sequence q, form the intervals of the form [qi, qi+1), and select those intervals
whose length is at most ; we refer to these as special intervals. We have already argued that v∗
must lie inside a special interval. Therefore, the adversary has enough information to conclude that
v∗ lies in the union of the special intervals. We denote that union by I(q), and we have
I(q)⊂I(q). (20)
7.2. Completing the Proof of the Lower Bound
We are now ready to prove the lower bound. We begin with a lemma.
Lemma 7.1 Fix a learner strategy φ that satisfies the accuracy constraint. For every y ∈
{1,2, . . . ,Y}, there exists x∈ (0, δ) such that there are at least log(δ/) of the queries in q(x, y) that
belong to (0, δ).
Lemma 7.1 is essentially the classical result that log(1/) query complexity of the bisection strategy
is optimal for the unit interval (cf. Waeber et al. (2013)), which proves the first term of the lower
bound in Theorem 4.1. We omit the proof of Lemma 7.1, which is fairly standard, but provide an
intuitive argument. Fix y ∈ {1,2, . . . ,Y}. Note that the interval (0, δ) consists of δ/ disjoint sub-
intervals of length  each. An accurate learner strategy, therefore, must be able to distinguish in
which one of these sub-intervals the true value resides. Distinguishing among δ/ possibilities using
binary feedback therefore implies that there will be some v∗ ∈ (0, δ) whose accurate identification
requires log(δ/) queries in (0, δ).
For the rest of this proof, fix v∗ = x0 and Y = y0 for some x0 and y0 satisfying Lemma 7.1, and
use q to denote q(x0, y0). We now consider the queries in the interval [δ,1]. Among them, we restrict
attention to those queries that are endpoints of special intervals. We call these special queries,
and let K be their number. We sort the special queries in ascending order, and denote them by
s1, s2, . . . , sK , where K is their number.
The outline of the rest of the argument is as follows. For a private learner strategy, the δ-cover
number of I(q) is at least L. From Eq. (20), it follows that the δ-cover number of I(q) is also at
4 For any choice of xˆ, there will always be some x ∈H such that |xˆ− x|> /2. Furthermore, such an x is a possible
value of v∗, as it would have produced the exact same sequence of responses.
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least L. Since endpoints of special intervals are within  of each other, every si must be within
 of a “neighboring” query (namely, si−1 or si+2), with the possible exception of s1, which could
be the right endpoint of a special interval whose left endpoint, denoted s0, is in [0, δ). Using the
assumption that δ > 2, each interval used in the cover can include two, and often three, queries
si. In what follows, we will make this argument precise, and show that the number, K, of special
queries is at least 2L− 3.
Let us consider first the case where the above mentioned exception does not arise; i.e., we assume
that s1 is not the right endpoint of a special interval. We decompose the set I(q) ∩ [δ,1] as the
union of its (finitely many) connected components, which we will call just components, for short;
see Figure 5 for an illustration. Each connected component is an interval whose endpoints are
special queries (si, for some i). Furthermore within each such interval, special queries are separated
by at most . Suppose that we have m components. For the jth component, let kj be the number
of special queries it contains, and let dj be its length. We have dj ≤ (kj−1). In particular, the jth
interval can be covered by at most⌈dj
δ
⌉
≤
⌈
(kj − 1) 
δ
⌉
≤
⌈kj − 1
2
⌉
≤ kj
2
intervals of length δ. (We have used here our standing assumption that δ > 2. Summing over
the different components, we conclude that I(q)∩ [δ,1] can be covered by at most ∑j kj/2 =K/2
intervals of length δ.
For the exceptional case where s1 is the right endpoint of a special interval [s0, s1], we just apply
the same argument, now on the set I(q)∩ [s0,1], and for an augmented collection of special queries,
(s0, s1, . . . , sK). Having effectively increased the number of points of interest, from K to K+ 1, we
obtain an upper bound of (K+1)/2 on the number of intervals of length δ that are needed to cover
I(q)∩ [s0,1].
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Connected Component Special Intervals
Figure 5 An illustration of the proof. s1−s0 ≤  and hence, [s0, s1] is a special interval. There are three connected
components: [s0, s1], [s2, s6], and [s7, s10]. The dashed lines with arrows represent a cover.
By combining the results of the two cases, and using one more interval of length δ to cover the
set [0, δ], we conclude that the δ-cover number of I(q), and therefore of I(q) as well, is at most
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(K + 3)/2. On the other hand, as long as we are dealing with an (, δ,L)-private strategy, this
δ-cover number is at least L. Thus (K + 3)/2≥L, or K ≥ 2L− 3.
Recall that the argument is being carried out for the case of particular x0 and y0 with the
properties specified earlier. For such x0 and y0, we have at least log(δ/) queries in the set [0, δ)
and at least 2L− 3 queries in the set [δ,1]. Recall that we have introduced an additional artificial
query at x= 1, i.e., qN+1 = 1, which is above and beyond the N queries used by the strategy, and
this query may be included in the K special queries. For this reason, the lower bound on N has to
be decremented by 1, leading to the lower bound in Theorem 4.1. Q.E.D.
8. Conclusions and Future Work
This paper studies an intrinsic privacy-complexity tradeoff faced by a learner in a sequential learn-
ing problem who tries to conceal her findings from an observant adversary. We use the notion of
information set, the set of possible true values, to capture the information available to the adver-
sary through the learner’s learning process, and focus on the coverability of the information set as
the main metric for measuring a learner strategy’s level of privacy. Our main result shows that to
ensure privacy, i.e., so that the resulting information set requires at least L intervals of size δ to
be fully covered, it is necessary for the learner to employ at least log(δ/) + 2L− 4 queries. We
further provide a constructive learner strategy that achieves privacy with log(1/L) + 2L queries.
Together, the upper and lower bounds on the query complexity demonstrate that increasing the
level of privacy, L, leads to a linear additive increase in the learner’s query complexity.
There are several interesting extensions and variations of the model that were left unaddressed.
One may consider the binary query model in higher dimensions, where v∗ ∈ Rn. A query in this
setting will be a hyperplane in Rn, where the response indicates whether the true value is to
the right or to the left of the queried hyperplane. Another interesting direction is to consider
adversaries with varying levels of risk aversion. The present model considers a risk-averse adversary
who considers all points in [0,1) as equally “plausible” as long as they have a positive probability
of being close to the true value. In contrast, a less risk-averse adversary may entirely ignore points
that are less likely to be close to the true value, thus reducing the size of the information set. One
such variation, the Bayesian Private Learning model, is explored in Appendix B.
More broadly, there could be other interesting problem formulations for understanding the pri-
vacy implications in a number of sequential decision problems in learning theory, optimization, and
decision theory. It is not difficult to see that standard algorithms, originally designed to optimize
run-time or query complexity, often provide little or no protection for the learner’s privacy. Can we
identify a universal procedure to design sample-efficient private decision strategies? Is there a more
general tradeoff between privacy and complexity in sequential decision making? We are optimistic
that there are many fruitful inquiries along these directions.
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Appendix
A. Coverability and the Adversary’s Probability of Correct Estimation
In this section we argue that the quantity 1/L can be interpreted as a probability of correct detec-
tion for the adversary. Recall the definition of set Q(x) of possible sequences when v∗ = x (cf.
Eq. (1)), and let Q=∪x∈[0,1)Q(x). We consider here adversary estimates xˆa that are random vari-
ables, determined by the observed query sequence q, together with an independent randomization
seed.
Definition A.1 Fix δ > 0, L≥ 2, a learner strategy φ∈ΦN , and a sequence of queries q ∈Q. We
say that an adversary estimate, xˆa, is (δ,L)-correct given q, if
P
(
|xˆa(q)−x| ≤ δ/2
)
>
1
L
, ∀x∈ I(q). (21)
where the probability is taken with respect to any randomization in the adversary’s estimate, xˆa.
In words, an adversary estimate is (δ,L)-correct given q if, as soon as the learner deploys the
queries q, the adversary will know that the estimate will incur an error of at most δ/2 with
probability larger than 1/L. In a sense, this means that q conceals the true value “poorly.” The
following proposition, the main result of this section, shows that the (δ,L− 1) coverability of the
information set is effectively equivalent to the existence of a (δ,L)-correct estimate.
Proposition A.2 Fix δ > 0, L≥ 2, a learner strategy φ ∈ ΦN , and a sequence of queries q ∈ Q.
The following hold.
1. If the δ-cover number of the information set I(q), Cδ
(I(q)), is at most L−1, then there exists
an adversary estimate that is (δ,L)-correct given q.
2. Conversely, if Cδ (I(q)) is at least L, then, for any δ′ < δ, there does not exist an adversary
estimate that is (δ′,L)-correct given q.
Proof. To prove the first statement, fix q ∈Q such that I(q) is (δ,L−1)-coverable. Then, there
exist L− 1 intervals, [a1, b1], [a2, b2], . . . , [aL−1, bL−1], each of length δ, that cover I(q). Consider
a randomized adversary estimate xˆa that is distributed uniformly at random among the L − 1
mid-points of the intervals. Then, with probability 1/(L− 1), the estimate xˆa will lie in the same
interval as the true value; since all intervals have length at most δ, such a xˆa will be at a distance
of at most δ/2 from the true value, i.e.,
P
(
|xˆa(q)−x| ≤ δ/2
)
=
1
L− 1 >
1
L
, ∀x∈ I(q).
This implies that xˆa is (δ,L)-correct given q, which proves the first statement. For the second
statement, we will make use of the following lemma.
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Lemma A.3 Fix δ ∈ (0,1) and L≥ 2. Let J be a subset of [0,1) such that the δ-cover number of
J , Cδ(J), is at least L. Then, there exist points {x1, x2, . . . , xL} in the closure of J such that
|xi−xj| ≥ δ, ∀i 6= j. (22)
Proof. We will prove the lemma by constructing the xj’s explicitly. Consider the following
procedure:
1. x1 = inf J .
2. For i= 2,3, . . ., define xi recursively as:
xi = inf{x∈ J : x≥ xi−1 + δ}. (23)
The procedure terminates at some step T when xT + δ ≥ 1 or [xT + δ,1) ∩ J = ∅ . Note that by
construction, all xi’s belong to the closure of J . Furthermore, the intervals
Wi := [xi, xi + δ], i= 1,2, . . . , T, (24)
form a cover of J . Since Cδ(J)≥ L by assumption, it follows that we must have T ≥ L. It is easy
to verify that the points {x1, x2, . . . , xL} satisfy the conditions outlined in the lemma, and which
completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Fix any adversary estimate xˆa, and some γ ∈ (δ′, δ), and q ∈Q such that Cδ
(I(q))≥ L. Apply
Lemma A.3 with J = I(q), and let {x1, x2, . . . , xL} be as defined in the lemma. Because the xi’s
belong to the closure of I(q), by perturbing them, we can obtain a set of points {x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜T} ⊂
I(q), such that
|x˜i− x˜j| ≥ γ > δ′, ∀i 6= j. (25)
Define intervals
Ui := [x˜i− δ′/2, x˜i + δ′/2], i= 1,2, . . . ,L. (26)
Since the distance between any two distinct x˜i’s is greater than δ
′, we know that the intervals Ui
are disjoint, which implies that there exists i∗ ∈ {1,2, . . . ,L} such that
P
(
|x̂a(q)− x˜i∗ | ≤ δ′/2
)
≤ P(x̂a(q)∈Ui∗)≤ 1/L. (27)
Since x˜i∗ ∈ I(q) by construction, we conclude that the adversary estimate xˆa is not (δ′,L)-correct
given q. This completes the proof of Proposition A.2. Q.E.D.
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B. Bayesian Private Learning Model
The Private Sequential Learning model we studied in this paper assumes that neither the learner
nor the adversary has any prior information regarding the true value v∗, and they can obtain
information only gradually, through queries. In this section, we discuss a Bayesian variation of
the model, where the true value v∗ is generated according to a prior distribution, known to both
parties. In particular, we assume that v∗ is distributed according to a distribution Pv∗ , where, for
simplicity, we assume that the support of Pv∗ is equal to [0,1).
Naturally, we allow the learner strategy, defined in Section 2.1, to depend on Pv∗ . In addition,
since the adversary aims to produce an estimate xˆa that is close to the true value, we define an
adversary strategy ψ to be a function that maps the adversary’s available information (i.e., the prior
distribution Pv∗ , the learner strategy φ, and the sequence of observed queries q) to a probability
distribution over [0,1), or, equivalently, to a random variable, xˆa, that takes values in [0,1). Denote
by Ψ the set of all such functions, i,e., the set of all adversary strategies.
Note that, since the true value in the Bayesian Private Learning model admits a prior distri-
bution, instead of using the information set, it is sufficient for the adversary to keep track of the
posterior distribution of v∗, given the learner’s queries. The Bayesian formulation also allows us to
measure the probability that the adversary is able to provide an estimate of the true value that is
within a given error tolerance. This leads to the following definition of private learner strategies.
Definition B.1 Fix  > 0, δ > 0, L∈N, and a prior distribution Pv∗. A learner strategy φ∈ΦN is
(, δ,L)-private if it satisfies the following:
1. Accuracy constraint: the strategy accurately recovers v∗ with probability one:
P
(∣∣xˆ(v∗, Y )− v∗∣∣≤ 
2
)
= 1,
where the probability is taken with respect to the randomness in v∗ and Y .
2. Privacy constraint: under this learner strategy, and for every adversary strategy ψ ∈ Ψ, we
have
P
(|xˆa− v∗| ≤ δ/2)≤ 1
L
, (28)
where the probability is taken with respect to the randomness in v∗, Y , and xˆa.
Notice the resemblance of the above definition with Definition 3.3. The parameters  and δ have
the same meaning as in the original model, while L mirrors the role of L in (δ,L)-coverability but
now has a more concrete interpretation in terms of the adversary’s probability of error.
Fix a prior distribution Pv∗ . Denote by N
∗(, δ,L) the minimum number of queries needed for
there to exist an (, δ,L)-private learner strategy:
N∗(, δ,L) = min
{
N ∈N : ∃φ∈ΦN s.t. φ is (, δ,L)-private
}
.
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Similar to the original model, we would like to obtain lower and upper bounds on N∗(, δ,L).
For the case where Pv∗ is a uniform distribution over [0,1), we can obtain the following result by
adapting the proof for the original model.
Proposition B.2 Fix  > 0, δ > 0, and a positive integer L≥ 2, such that 2 < δ ≤ 1/L. Suppose
that the prior distribution Pv∗ is uniform over [0,1). Then,
log
1

≤N∗(, δ,L)≤L log 1
L
+L− 1.
Note that compared to the bounds in Theorem 4.1, the leading terms in the upper and lower
bounds in Proposition B.2 differ by a multiplicative factor of L. The lower bound, log(1/) follows
directly from the accuracy constraint (see Section 7). However, the proof for the stronger lower
bound in Theorem 4.1, log(δ/) + 2L− 4, does not apply to this Bayesian setting. This is because
a “large” information set, in terms of coverability, does not necessarily imply a high probability
of error for the adversary in the Bayesian setting: indeed, some parts of the information set could
have very small posterior probability of containing the true value, and thus could effectively be
ignored by the adversary. Therefore, the Bayesian framework may be significantly more favorable
to the adversary, possibly resulting in a large value of N∗(, δ,L).
For the same reason, the Opportunistic Bisection strategy in Section 6 is no longer private in the
Bayesian setting, since the guesses now have negligible posterior probability of containing v∗, and
hence do not provide effective obfuscation against the adversary. The upper bound in Proposition
B.2 can be achieved by the Replicated Bisection strategy in Section 5, with L replications. Because
the Replicated Bisection strategy creates L identical copies of query patterns across L sub-intervals,
the symmetry ensures that the posterior distribution of v∗ will be evenly spread across all sub-
intervals, forcing the adversary’s probability of correct detection to be at most 1/L.
How to close the gap between the upper and lower bounds in Proposition B.2 is an interesting
open question. Intuition seems to suggest that the lower bound can be substantially improved, and
that the upper bound could be (close to) optimal. Unfortunately, our current proof technique for
the lower bound is highly dependent on the structure of the information set and is unlikely to be
able to close this gap.
